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Workers’ Worries and  
Labour Market Policies
Pieter Vanhuysse
1. Introduction: levels of activation  
spending and employment protection  
in the OECD 
Cutbacks in the size and generosity of social policies have largely domi-
nated the ‘new politics’ of oECD welfare states since the 1980s.1 But 
active labour market policies (almps) have been in many respects an 
exception, largely due to the new ‘activation paradigm’ that has been 
central on policy-making agendas since at least the mid-1990s.2 in the Eu, 
for instance, great emphasis was given on almp programmes by the 1994 
Essen summit, the European Employment strategy and the luxemburg 
Employment summit in 1997, and the 2000 lisbon treaty. 
as figure 1 shows, there has been a high degree of variance in activation 
spending in the past decade across the oECD.  almp spending has ranged 
from 1.7 per cent of GDp in Denmark and between 0.9 and 1.3 per cent 
in finland, france, sweden, Belgium and the netherlands to less than 0.3 
per cent in countries such as slovenia, slovakia, the Czech republic, japan, 
israel, the usa, south Korea, and Estonia. underlying these period-average 
figures are strong increases even in the latter two countries. Estonia and 
south Korea, while starting from low levels, have also more than doubled 
their almp spending levels between 2004 and 2011. 
 
1 on welfare state retrenchment, see e.g. starke (2006), tepe & Vanhuysse (2010),  
Vanhuysse & Goerres (2012).
2 on the activation paradigm, see e.g. Bonoli (2013). on activation of older workers 
specifically, see e.g. Gasior et al. (2011), marin (2013).
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activation spending, which has traditionally been viewed as a labour 
market outsider programme, can be usefully compared and contrasted 
with efforts aimed at protecting current jobs, as captured by the oECD’s 
Employment protection legislation (Epl) index, which gives a numerical 
measure on a 0-6 scale based on a list of laws and regulations regard-
ing the protection of regular (permanent) workers against individual 
dismissal and of temporary forms of employment (standard fixed-term 
and temporary-work-agency contracts), and regarding additional, specific 
requirements for collective dismissals.3 
Figure 2 shows EPL levels in OECD countries for the first type of em-
ployees – those on regular contracts, i.e. labour market insiders. With the 
sole exception of spain and portugal (which anyhow remains the highest 
Epl-country nevertheless), this type of employees has enjoyed a remark-
able status quo in Epl levels throughout the oECD between the mid-
1980s and 2013; the very decades of alleged labour market liberalization 
and globalization – and the activation paradigm. on average, Epl levels 
for these regular contracts have only marginally gone down in this period, 
from 2.2 in 1985 to 2.0 in 2013.  
 
3 for more methodological information, see:  
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Epl-methodology.pdf
Figure 1: 
average levels of active 
labour market policy spending 
(% of GDp), 2004-2011
source: 
author’s computations from oECD 
Employment and labour market statistics 
(downloaded 15 may 2014)
	  
The decades of labour mar-
ket liberalization, globali-
zation and the rise of the 
activation paradigm have 
witnessed a remarkable 
status quo in EPL levels for 
workers with regular  
contracts.
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But how to explain almp spending levels today? are they connected to 
Epl levels, and if so, in what way? to start answering the latter question, 
figure 3 plots average levels of almp spending and average Epl levels 
for regular contracts for the same years (2004-2011). At first sight, the 
link between these variables seems to be weak: there is only a moderate 
positive correlation between almp spending and Epl levels (pearson cor-
relation coefficient 0.39). 
Figure 2: 
Employment protection 
legislation against individual 
and collective dismissals: 
regular contracts
source: 
author’s computations from oECD 
indicators of Employment protection 
(downloaded 28 may 2014). 
note: 
first data point for south Korea, 
new Zealand and the Central and 
Eastern European countries 
refers to the early 1990s.
	  
Figure 3: 
average levels of almp 
spending (X axis) and Employ-
ment protection legislation 
for employees with regular 
contracts (y axis), 2004-2011
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2. Explaining active labour market policy 
spending: Three hypotheses
This Policy Brief summarizes theoretical findings from a study I did with 
markus tepe (university of oldenburg) that adds a new thesis on the 
political mechanisms behind almp spending (tepe & Vanhuysse 2013).  
An influential theory by Rueda (2007) argues that left-wing political par-
ties have relatively little interest in promoting almps, as they increasingly 
see their electoral core as labour market insiders, not the outsiders that 
allegedly most benefit from ALMP programmes. Like economic insider-
outsider theories (e.g. lindbeck & snower 2001, saint-paul 2000), rueda 
points out that labour is not a homogeneous block, but he also posits 
that left-wing parties view only traditional ‘insiders’ as their core voting 
base, which they want to favour with job protection (Epl). By contrast, 
left-wing parties see increasingly less need to spend on almps that al-
legedly favour labour market ‘outsiders’ – primarily the unemployed and 
atypical workers such as part-time, flexi-time and temporary workers. 
We point out that as deindustrialization has rapidly eroded left parties’ 
traditional electoral base in recent decades, and as women increasingly 
expect state support for combining employment with motherhood, these 
parties have had to shift their policies towards more centrist positions 
and to social programmes such as human capital investment, family poli-
cies and childcare that were attractive to middle-class female voters. such 
strategies have become increasingly viable electorally as the widening of 
higher education and the expansion of service sector employment have 
created simultaneously a wider and more heterogeneous base of middle 
class voters (hausermann & schwander 2009, Emmenegger et al. 2012, 
Esping-andersen 2009).  We thus posit a ‘left party disinvestment thesis’ 
H1: Left-wing party power in government has no effect (weak version) or a 
negative effect (strong version) on ALMP spending. 
But in addition, we theoretically introduce a new actor in almp politics – 
contemporary trade unions. unions today need to be responsive towards 
the increasing re-employability worries of their members. in the past, unions, 
too, viewed ALMPs as benefiting non-unionized labour market outsiders. 
But today unions are likely to promote almps as a second-best priority 
programme. in contexts where high Epl levels have not been achieved 
(the first-best goal), more powerful unions will today push for almp 
spending as an alternative way to offer their members some measure of 
desired labour market security (tepe & Vanhuysse 2013). as noted, the 
success of left-wing parties today depends increasingly on their ability to 
win office by votes from women and the middle class. But the success of 
The success of left-wing 
parties increasingly depends 
on their ability to win votes 
from women and the middle 
class. But the success of trade 
unions still depends primar-
ily on their ability to protect 
their membership core – pre-
dominantly industrial work-
ers. Unions therefore are 
likely to promote ALMPs as a 
second-best goal. 
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trade unions still depends primarily on their ability to protect and pro-
mote their membership core – predominantly industrial workers (palier 
& thelen 2010, jensen 2012). But how do unions approach almps, which 
have been commonly viewed as benefiting outsiders? standard political 
economy accounts assume that unions pursue the interests of insiders 
exclusively (lindbeck & snower 2001, saint-paul 2000). such views would 
posit that greater power will lead unions to push exclusively for insider 
programmes such as Epl, even at the expense of alleged outsider pro-
grammes such as almps. 
We disagree with this standard view of almps as outsider programmes. 
in the wake of liberalizing labour markets, growing international competi-
tion, industrial decline, new flexicurity and workfare policies (sometimes 
masquerading behind the activation paradigm) and increasingly punctu-
ated working careers, the interests of union members today are not the 
same as during the golden era of industrialism. union members are as 
likely as ever to demand continued job security (Epl) from their leader-
ship (nelson 2009). But in addition, union leaderships today also need to 
ensure workers’ re-employability chances. in the 1990s, union members 
tended to simultaneously have a higher sense of job security (thanks in 
large part to Epl) and a higher sense of re-employability insecurity (an-
derson & pontusson 2007). in tepe & Vanhuysse (2013) we use evidence 
from the issp 2005/2006 wave to show that also in recent years union 
members tend to be on the whole less worried about the security of 
their current job than non-members. But when it comes to worries 
about re-employability in the event of job loss, union members are more 
worried than non-members in all oECD countries but one. these re-
employability worries are likely to feed back to union leaderships, leading 
them to use their political clout to push for higher almp spending.4  We 
therefore expect union leaderships to actively promote almp spending 
today, particularly on those programmes that are most likely to help their 
own members, such as employment assistance and labour market training. 
this leads us to posit a ‘self-interested advocacy thesis’ H2: Larger and more 
strike-prone trade unions have a positive effect on ALMP spending.
these almp strategies of unions are likely to be context-dependent. 
Given the remaining importance of job security for their members, Epl 
is likely to remain key.  as we have seen, labour market insiders have en-
joyed a remarkable status quo in Epl levels since the mid-1980s.  
4 admittedly, union movements are not unitary actors. Environments with many smaller unions 
potentially produce different strategies than those with few large unions (Calmfors and Driffill 
1988). moreover, the leaders and members of unions are subject to similar principal–agent prob-
lems as those that characterize the relationship between employers and employees (Vanhuysse 
and sulitzeanu-Kenan 2009; on Central Europe, see Vanhuysse (2007). But it is plausible that union 
leaders in hard times have strong incentives to promote the clear interests of their core member-
ship. on employment security wishes of Europeans, see also Chung and  Van oorschot, 2011.
Union members are less wor-
ried about the security of 
their current job than non-
members, but they are more 
worried than non-members 
about their re-employability 
in the event of job loss.
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the need for union leaders to push for almp spending and alleviate their 
members’ re-employability worries is likely to be especially salient in the 
low-Epl labour markets on the left side of figure 2, such as the anglo-
saxon and Eastern European countries. this leads us to posit a ‘context-
dependent advocacy’ thesis H3: Lower levels of EPL will be associated with a 
stronger positive effect of union density and of strike rates on ALMP spending. 
in other words, in countries where high Epl has already been achieved 
(the first-order goal), unions are expected to focus their political clout 
mainly on defending these past successes. But when and where high Epl 
levels have historically not been achieved, we suggest that more powerful 
unions will tend to promote ALMP spending (the second-best, or first-
best feasible goal), as an alternative way to offer their members some 
(market-conform and activation paradigm-conform) state help towards 
their potential re-employability.
3. Findings in brief
our regression models in tepe & Vanhuysse (2013) show that left-wing 
party power in government in recent decades has actually led to lower, 
not higher, levels of almp spending. this lends support to the left party 
disinvestment hypothesis (h1). But interestingly, union power as meas-
ured by larger memberships and higher strike-proneness today is system-
atically associated with significantly higher levels of almp spending. this 
corroborates the self-interested union advocacy hypothesis (h2). When 
we focus on particular sub-dimensions of almp spending, unions are 
found to use their clout to push for higher spending on those particular 
programmes that most directly help their own members: employment 
assistance and, especially, training. This provides more specific support for 
h2. unions with a larger political clout may act as almp promoters, but 
at the same time they make sure to benefit their own rank-and-file first 
and foremost. 
the third hypothesis held that union strategies towards almp spend-
ing depend on whether or not labour market insiders are already highly 
protected in their jobs (h3). to explore this we stepwise introduced 
three multiplicative interaction terms into our regression models. When 
we look at the effect of union density on almp spending, a scissor-shaped 
pattern emerges. in contexts with very high levels of Epl, as in contem-
porary Continental and southern Europe, higher union density has a 
negative effect on almp spending. But where Epl is very low, as in anglo-
saxon liberal market economies, growing union density leads to large 
increases in almp spending. a similar scissor-shaped pattern is evident 
also when investigating how Epl mediates the effect of union strike rates: 
Interestingly, left-wing party 
power in government is as-
sociated with lower levels of 
ALMP spending, but larger 
and more strike-prone un-
ions with significantly higher 
levels of ALMP spending.
There is a scissor-shaped 
pattern: in high-EPL labour 
markets, greater union pow-
er does not increase ALMP 
spending, whereas in low-EPL 
labour markets it does.
Pieter Vanhuysse • WorKErs’ WorriEs anD laBour marKEt poliCiEs
poliCy BriEf junE 2014
7
more assertive unions have a positive effect on almp spending in low-
Epl labour markets. this corroborates the context-dependent advocacy 
thesis (h3). stronger unions appear to more strongly push for almp 
spending mainly when and where regular workers are not yet well pro-
tected. this may be because in contexts where high Epl levels have never 
become a key part of the larger macro-political economy model, almps 
have become the first-best feasible union priority, as they offer workers 
support for re-skilling and retraining and can simultaneously be presented 
as a clearly market-strengthening policy. in other words, unions today ap-
pear to consider almps as a second-best goal, EPL being their first priority.
4. Conclusions
this policy Brief has made three arguments. first, left-wing party power 
today is no longer associated with higher almp spending. second, in line 
with the idea that unions’ almp strategies increasingly need to take into 
account the growing re-employability worries of their members, larger 
and more strike-prone unions tend to increase ALMP spending – specifi-
cally those programmes that help union members, such as employment 
assistance and, especially, training. third, Epl levels mediate: more pow-
erful unions push up almp spending especially in those labour markets 
where jobs are not well protected. union leaderships, aware of the 
worries of their membership in case of job loss, today are more likely to 
use their clout to push for policies that boost workers’ reemployment 
chances in low-Epl labour markets, where job turnover is high and dis-
missal is easier. in liberal and liberalizing market economies, almps may 
simply turn into the first-best feasible union goal, as they are valued by 
their members as a form of re-employability security, yet can be framed 
as a market-strengthening and activation-conform policy tool. This finding 
simultaneously casts doubt on the widespread view of almps as being a 
labour market outsider programme (saint-paul 2000, rueda 2007, lind-
beck & snower 2001).
in other words, unions still cater mainly for their membership, but in 
different ways than in the past. this may actually consolidate the strong 
tendency towards dual labour markets (Emmenegger et al. 2012, obinger 
et al. 2012). long-term trends of Epl for regular contracts, which largely 
correspond with insider jobs, and for temporary contracts (outsider 
jobs) show very different pathways of development over the past thirty 
years. as we have seen, regular contracts have seen a status quo in Epl 
(figure 2). in stark contrast to this, figure 4 shows that temporary job 
contracts have suffered very substantially from reductions of protection 
levels. these labour market outsider contracts have gone down from 
Where high EPL levels have 
not been achieved, unions 
may use their clout to pro-
mote activation spending 
as a second-best priority, as 
this offers workers re-em-
ployability security and can 
be presented as a market-
strengthening policy.
Unions today use ALMPs 
to cater for their member-
ship – labour market insid-
ers. This may consolidate the 
tendency towards dual labour 
markets
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2.1 to 1.4 on average for the oECD. for instance, temporary-contract 
employees have seen reductions in their Epl levels of over 40 per cent 
in Belgium, japan, and portugal in this period, and of around 60 per cent 
or more in Denmark, italy and sweden. By contrast, these latter three 
countries have left Epl levels for employees with regular contracts es-
sentially unchanged in this same period. and in Germany, which actually 
implemented 78 per cent cutbacks for temporary employees, regular 
employees have even seen Epl increases. 
These findings are in line with the observation that unions in globalized 
times are increasingly willing to support social spending cutbacks if this 
is likely to safeguard the status quo in terms of their labour market 
policy interests (Clayton and pontusson 1998). similarly, Davidsson and 
Emmenegger (2012) show that when it comes to job security legisla-
tion, unions tend to protect permanent contracts while simultaneously 
consenting in sometimes far-reaching further deregulation of temporary 
employment (see also palier & thelen 2010, iversen 2005, Emmenegger et 
al. 2012, jensen 2012). in sum, unions today can be viewed as still primar-
ily concerned with protecting labour market insider interests: through 
Epl when they can; through almp spending when they must.
 
Figure 4: 
Employment protection 
legislation against dismissals: 
temporary contracts
source: 
author’s computations from oECD 
indicators of Employment protection 
(downloaded 28 may 2014). 
note: 
first data point for south Korea, 
new Zealand and the Central and 
Eastern European countries 
refers to the early 1990s.
	  
While workers with regular 
contracts have seen a status 
quo in EPL in recent decades, 
workers on temporary job 
contracts have suffered very 
substantial reductions of pro-
tection levels.
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